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The possible role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia (i.e., denial of motor deficits
contralateral to a brain lesion), has long been debated between psychodynamic and neu-
rocognitive theories. However, there are only a handful of case studies focussing on this
topic, and the precise role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia requires empirical
investigation. In the present study, we aimed to investigate how negative and positive
emotions influence motor awareness in anosognosia. Positive and negative emotions were
induced under carefully-controlled experimental conditions in right-hemisphere stroke
patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (n ¼ 11) and controls with clinically normal
awareness (n ¼ 10). Only the negative, emotion induction condition resulted in a significant
improvement of motor awareness in anosognosic patients compared to controls; the
positive emotion induction did not. Using lesion overlay and voxel-based lesion-symptom
mapping approaches, we also investigated the brain lesions associated with the diagnosis
of anosognosia, as well as with performance on the experimental task. Anatomical areas
that are commonly damaged in AHP included the right-hemisphere motor and sensory
cortices, the inferior frontal cortex, and the insula. Additionally, the insula, putamen and
anterior periventricular white matter were associated with less awareness change
following the negative emotion induction. This study suggests that motor unawareness
and the observed lack of negative emotions about one's disabilities cannot be adequately
explained by either purely motivational or neurocognitive accounts. Instead, we propose
an integrative account in which insular and striatal lesions result in weak interoceptive
and motivational signals. These deficits lead to faulty inferences about the self, involving aartment, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London WC1E 7HJ, UK.
(S. Besharati), a.fotopoulou@ucl.ac.uk (A. Fotopoulou).
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c o r t e x 6 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 2 7e1 4 0128difficulty to personalise new sensorimotor information, and an abnormal adherence to
premorbid beliefs about the body.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Neurological disturbances of body awareness provide a useful
way of investigating the bodily self; a fundamental facet of
self-consciousness (Gallagher, 2000). Anosognosia for hemi-
plegia (AHP; i.e., the denial of motor deficits contralateral to a
brain lesion) is a prototypical example of a disturbance in body
awareness. AHP occurs more frequently following right peri-
sylvian lesions, and less often following left-hemisphere
perisylvian lesions (Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou,
& Della Sala, 2009). AHP can take various clinical forms,
ranging from blatant denial of limb paralysis and associated
delusional beliefs to milder forms of motor unawareness (see
Fotopoulou, 2014; Jenkinson, Preston & Ellis, 2011; Marcel,
Tegnel & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). Although the exact aetiology
of AHP remains debated, the clinical variability of AHP sug-
gests that it is a multifaceted and heterogeneous phenome-
non (Fotopoulou, 2014; Marcel, Tegner,&Nimmo-Smith, 2004;
Orfei et al., 2007; Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010).
Accordingly, explanations have varied from selective deficits
in motor planning, to multi-factorial accounts involving both
basic sensorimotor and higher-order cognitive deficits (see
Fotopoulou, 2014; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010 for reviews).
These cognitive deficits have been associated with either
particular lesion sites such as the premotor cortex (Berti et al.,
2005) and the insula (Karnath, Baier & Nagele, 2005), or
involvement of a more varied pattern of cortical and subcor-
tical regions and their connections (Fotopoulou, Pernigo,
Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2010; Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli,
Cordioli & Aglioti, 2011; Vocat et al., 2010).
One facet of AHP that has received less empirical attention,
despite a long history of clinical observations and theoretical
debates (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Weinstein & Kahn, 1955),
is the role of emotional factors. On clinical examination, pa-
tients typically manifest some degree of blunted affect or
‘indifference’ for their paralysis and its consequences. This
indifference (anosodiaphoria, Babinski, 1914) can exist with or
without concomitant explicit denial of deficits. On the con-
trary, depressive symptoms and ‘catastrophic reactions’
(sudden influx of strong, negative feelings and related be-
haviours; Goldstein, 1939) are encountered rarely. Moreover,
there are some clinical indications that as unawareness de-
creases over time, depressive symptoms begin to emerge in
patients who were previously emotionally unresponsive to-
wards their paralysis (Besharati, Kopelman, Avesani, Moro, &
Fotopoulou, 2014; Fotopoulou, Rudd, Holmes & Kopelman,
2009; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). Exceptionally, some pa-
tients with or without explicit denial of deficits have been
noted to show a strong hatred towards their paralysed limbs
(misoplegia; Critchley, 1974), or a disproportionate exaspera-
tion with irrelevant, minor disappointments, despite theirapparent indifference for their paralysis (Fotopoulou &
Conway, 2004; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Weinstein &
Kahn, 1950).
Some authors have argued that this lack of affect, or
misattribution of negative emotions, is caused by purely
psychogenic ‘defence’ mechanisms. According to the now
classic theory of Weinstein and colleagues (e.g. Weinstein,
1991; Weinstein & Kahn, 1955), denial and related premorbid
coping mechanisms prevent patients from explicitly
acknowledging their paralysis, and self-attributing the asso-
ciated negative emotions. Alternatively, this lack of emotional
reactivity has been considered to be the direct consequence of
damage to the right (frontal) hemisphere, regarded by some
authors as specialised for the processing of negative,
withdrawal-related emotions (Davidson, 2001; see Gainotti,
2012 for review). However, neither of these two approaches
has been fully supported by empirical evidence. Specifically,
the psychodynamic account of AHP fails to explain the rela-
tive neuroanatomical and behavioural specificity of anosog-
nosic behaviours (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Heilman &
Harciarek, 2010). The ‘valence’ hypothesis has similarly not
been supported in the literature; although patients with AHP
do typically score lower than control patients in self-report
measures of depression and anxiety (e.g., Fotopoulou et al.,
2010), more sensitive investigations have shown that they
do not differ from controls groups in their ability to experience
such emotions (Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005; Vocat et al.,
2010). They also show appropriate, negative emotional re-
actions to their deficits when the latter are evoked implicitly
(Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Nadrone, Ward, Fotopoulou, &
Turnbull, 2007). Thus, it appears that the relation between
AHP and emotion is more complex than suggested by either
the psychodynamic or the valence hypothesis.
More generally, such rigid distinctions between purely
psychodynamic and neurocognitive explanations have been
challenged recently (Fotopoulou, 2012) and integrative ac-
counts of AHP have been put forward (Fotopoulou, 2010;
Turnbull et al., 2005; Turnbull & Solms, 2007; Vuilleumier,
2004; see also Turnbull, Fotopoulou & Solms, 2014). Accord-
ing to such theories, complex imbalances between cognition
and motivation may be caused directly by damage to insular,
striatal, or limbic regions that have recently been found to be
selectively associated with AHP (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro,
Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordiolo,&Aglioti, 2011; Vocat et al., 2010).
For example, Vuilleumier and colleagues have suggested that
damage to the basal ganglia may obstruct the “discovery” of
deficits, as patients have reduced affective drive to respond to
errors and revise beliefs based on new perceptual evidence
(Vocat, Saj, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Vuilleumier, 2000, 2004).
Similarly, within a computational framework, Fotopoulou and
colleagues have suggested that insular and basal ganglia
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physiological condition of one's body. This leads to aberrant
‘top-down’ inferences about bodily states, and difficulties in
affectively personalising new sensorimotor information
(Fotopoulou, 2014).
Taken together, these accounts suggest that the lack or
misattribution of negative emotions in AHP relates to im-
pairments in higher-order cognition, rather than to primary
deficits in emotional processing. This ‘top-down’ perspective
is consistent with a relatively neglected facet of AHP, namely,
the fluctuations of awareness based on the emotional or social
context in which awareness is probed. For instance, Kaplan-
Solms and Solms (2000), see also Ross & Rush (1981);
Starkstein & Robinson (1988); Turnbull, Jones, & Reed-Screen
(2002) have shown that when themes of loss are explored
during psychotherapeutic sessions e particularly when such
loss is apparently unrelated to their disabilities e transient
awareness and depressive episodes can be experienced by
patients that are otherwise stably anosognosic. Marcel et al.
(2004) have further shown that awareness may increase in
some patients when they are asked about their disabilities in
an emotional, conspiratory manner, or from the perspective
of the examiner (see also Fotopoulou, 2014; Fotopoulou, Rudd,
Holmes, & Kopelman, 2009). Notwithstanding the theoretical
interest of these observations, to our knowledge there is no
systematic, experimental investigation of themoderating role
of emotional and social context in AHP.
Accordingly, we aimed to investigate the relation between
emotion and motor awareness in AHP. To this end, we
recruited right-hemisphere stroke patients with AHP and
control patients without AHP, and assessed motor awareness
before and after providing positive and negative feedback
about performance on a standardised cognitive test (the
Hayling Test; Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The task includes
components of varied difficulty that we could match with the
valence of the provided feedback to generate realistic condi-
tions of positive and negative feedback. Moreover, it is unre-
lated to motor abilities so we could test the role of emotion on
motor awareness, uncomplicated by ‘bottom-up’ sensori-
motor signals and the patients' explicit or implicit feelings
about their motor abilities. Based on the idea that patients
with AHP have lost the ability to use signals from their own
body to make related inferences about their current bodily
state (Fotopoulou, 2014; see also above), our main aim was to
test whether the ‘top-down’ experimental induction (by ver-
bal, social feedback) of negative feelings about oneself could
improve awareness of one's motor disabilities. We expected
patients with AHP to show increased awareness of their def-
icits following negative feedback compared with positive
feedback, while such effects were not expected in the control
group. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the experimental
feedback had induced the desired emotions in patients, we
measured patients' self-reported emotional state following
each condition of the main task. If patients with AHP were
capable of experiencing negative emotions, we expected
negative feedback to lead to more negative feelings than
positive feedback in both patient groups.
Lastly, we examined whether lesions to critical cortical
(premotor and the insular cortex) and subcortical (basal
ganglia and limbic structures) areas would be associated withincreased unawareness scores, as in previous studies (Berti
et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Karnath et al., 2005; Moro
et al., 2011). Contrary to such lesion subtraction in-
vestigations, however, we used a voxel-based lesion-symp-
tom mapping (VLSM) approach (Bates et al., 2003; Rorden,
Karnath, & Bonilha, 2007). This advanced method character-
ises the statistical relationship between tissue damage and
behaviour on a voxel-by-voxel basis, regardless of the classi-
fication of patients into categorical groups, or implementing a
cut-off for pathology (Bates et al., 2003). We also used this
method to identify the brain regions associated with a change
in motor awareness induced by our experimental task, which
according to our hypothesis should include the insular cortex
and basal ganglia structures (Fotopoulou, 2014; see also
above).While the first clinico-anatomical correlation has been
investigated before in the literature, to our knowledge, only
two previous studies have investigated the association be-
tween behaviour on carefully-controlled experimental con-
ditions and neuroanatomical data (Fotopoulou et al., 2010;
Moro et al., 2011), and no study has examined this associa-
tion in relation to emotion.2. Methods
2.1. Patients
Twenty-five, adult neurological patients with right-
hemisphere lesions were recruited from consecutive admis-
sions to an acute, stroke-rehabilitation ward. Inclusion
criteria were: (i) right-hemisphere lesion as confirmed by
clinical neuroimaging; (ii) contralateral hemiplegia; and (iii) <4
months from symptom onset. Exclusion criteria were: (i)
previous history of neurological or psychiatric illness; (ii) <7
years of education; (iii) medication with severe cognitive or
mood side-effects; (iv) language impairments that precluded
completion of the study assessments. Of the initial 25 patients
screened, nine could not be tested due to time constraints
(n ¼ 4), fatigue or poor concentration (n ¼ 3), and early
discharge (n ¼ 2). Thus, a total of 16 patients took part in the
study (nine women; mean age ¼ 68.19, SD ¼ 14.27 years, age
range: 41e88). Two additional sets of patients were recruited
subsequently in order to test (see section 2.4): (i) a control
condition in which the order of experimental conditions was
reversed (n ¼ 2; two women with AHP, 82 and 90 years of age);
and (ii) the specificity of the effect to motor awareness (n ¼ 3;
two patients without AHP, 57-year-old male and 70-year-old
female, and one female AHP patient, 84 years of age). The
study was approved by the local NHS Ethics Committee.
2.2. Assessment of anosognosia and associated
disorders
Eight of the 16 patients were classified as having AHP (four
women; mean age¼ 71.63, SD ¼ 16.18 years, age range: 41e88)
and eight were classified as right-hemisphere controls (HP
group; five women; mean age ¼ 64.75, SD ¼ 12.14 years, age
range: 47e78). This classification was based on the Berti,
Ladavas, and Della Corte (1996) interview, which includes
general questions (e.g., ‘why are you in the hospital?’),
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‘Can you move your left arm?’), and ‘confrontation’ questions
(e.g., ‘Please touch my hand with your left hand. Have you
done it?’). The interview is scored on a 3-point scale (2¼ denial
ofmotor impairment and failure to reach the examiners hand;
1 ¼ denial of motor impairment, but admits to failure to reach
examiner hand; and 0 ¼ full acknowledgement of motor def-
icits), with patients scoring 1 or 2 categorised as anosognosic.
The Feinberg, Roane, and Ali (2000) scale was used as a sec-
ondary measure of unawareness. The scale consists of 10
items including general self-report items (e.g. ‘Do you have
any weakness anywhere?’) and task-related items (e.g.,
‘Please try and move your left arm for me. Did you move it?’).
Responses were scored by the examiner for each item
(0 ¼ completely aware, .5 ¼ partially unaware, and
1 ¼ complete unawareness), and summed to produce an
overall ‘Feinberg awareness score’ (0 ¼ complete awareness,
10 ¼ complete unawareness). Finally, body ownership dis-
turbances such as asomatognosia (the inability to recognise
one's own body; Cutting, 1978) and somatoparaphrenia (body
ownership delusions; Gerstman, 1942) were assessed using
the Cutting (1978) questionnaire. Two AHP patients exhibited
disturbances of body ownership: one patient manifested
somatoparaphrenia (believing that her left arm belonged to
her friend), and the other asomatognosia. No other somatic
delusions were noted in either group.
2.3. Neurological and neuropsychological assessment
Motor strength of the upper and lower limbs was assessed
using the Medical Research Council scale (MRC; Guarantors of
Brain, 1986). Premorbid intelligence was assessed using the
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001). Orientation
in time, space and person, as well as general cognitive func-
tioning, was assessed using the Mini Mental State Examina-
tion (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). Working
memory was assessed using the digit span task from the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (Wechsler, 1998). Long-
term verbal recall was assessed using the 5-item test from
the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA; Nasreddine et al.,
2005). Proprioception was assessed with eyes closed by
applying small, vertical, controlled movements to three joints
(middle finger, wrist and elbow), at three time intervals (cor-
rect responses were rated as 0 and incorrect ones as 1) (Vocat
et al., 2010). The customary ‘confrontation’ technique was
administered to test visual fields and tactile extinction
(Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, & Berti, 1986). Five subtests
of the Behavioural Inattention Test (BIT; Wilson, Cockborn &
Halligan, 1987; line crossing, star cancellation, copy, repre-
sentational drawing and line bisection) were employed to
assess unilateral, visuospatial neglect. Personal neglect was
assessed using the ‘one item test’ (Bisiach et al., 1986), and the
‘comb/razor’ test (McIntoch, Brodie, Beschin, & Robertson,
2000). Executive and reasoning abilities were assessed using
the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB; Dubois, Slachevsky,
Litvan, & Pillon, 2000), and the Cognitive Estimates test
(Shallice & Evans, 1978). The Hospital Depression and Anxiety
Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), was used to assess
depression and anxiety.2.4. Experimental study design
Our main experimental aim was to induce positive and
negative emotions in patients with AHP and HP controls, and
assess their effects on motor awareness. To this end, we
administered a standardised cognitive task, the Hayling Sen-
tence Completion Test of executive functioning (Burgess &
Shallice, 1997), which entails two similar tasks varying in
difficulty. Namely, a simple, sentence completion task
(measuring processing speed), and a more difficult sentence
completion task, in which patients have to provide responses
that are unrelated to themeaning of the sentences (measuring
inhibition of automatic responses). Healthy controls and
particularly neurological populations are known to perform
faster on the first task, and with fewer errors, compared with
the second task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997; see Results section
below for confirmation of this result in our sample). In order to
ensure the induction of positive and negative feelings
respectively, we further manipulated the explicit, verbal
feedback provided by the experimenter after each trial: posi-
tive feedback was provided following trials of the easy task,
and negative feedback was provided following trials of the
difficult task. Hence, feedback could be administered ‘realis-
tically’ and ensure construct validity. This feedback manipu-
lation can be understood as a mood induction procedure
(Nummenmaa & Niemi, 2004), widely used in psychological
research, including with neurological patients (e.g., Mograbi,
Brown, Salas, & Morris, 2012). The induced emotions are
considered short lived and within the normal daily range of
emotional experience for most people (Frost & Green, 1982;
Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Martin, 1990). This was confirmed
in this sample at debriefing (see procedures section below).
The experiment had a 2 (Group: AHP vs HP)  2 (Emotion:
positive vs negative feedback) mixed factorial design, with
Emotion as the within-subjects factor. Due to the nature and
the standardised administration order of the Hayling Test
(Part 1: the easier sentence completion task is followed by Part
2: the harder sentence completion task) positive feedback
preceded negative feedback in our experiment. Thus, to
examine possible order effects, we also conducted a control
experiment in two additionally recruited AHP patients, in
whomwe reversed the order of positive and negative feedback
(i.e., first administering Section 2 with negative feedback, and
then Section 1 with positive feedback).
Finally, in order to determine the specificity of the emotion
induction on motor awareness we conducted an additional
control experiment with three right-hemisphere damaged
patients. The experimental procedure was identical to the
above, with the exception of additional pre-and-post mea-
sures to assess any changes in visuospatial neglect, personal
neglect, and anosognosia for drawing neglect, in addition to
motor awareness. Specifically, changes in neglect were
assessed by administering the copy, line bisection and star
cancellation subtests of the BIT (Wilson et al., 1987) and the
‘one-item test’ (Bisiach et al., 1986) pre-and-post the positive
and negative emotion induction. Four additional questions
were added to the motor awareness questionnaire (please see
below) to assess awareness of drawing neglect (Berti et al.,
1996). Referring to their performance on the ‘copy’ subtest of
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1987) patients were asked: (i) two general questions (e.g.,
“Are you happy with your drawing of the Daisy?” and “Are the
daisies alike?”); and (ii) to provide subjective ratings of their
drawing performance using a 11-point Likert-type scale (e.g.,
“Using this scale from 0 to 10, how good is the drawing, 0 being
not good at all and 10 being very good?” and “Using this scale
from 0 to 10, how alike are the drawings, 0 being not at all alike
and 10 being exactly the same?”).
2.5. Measures
The primary dependent variable was ‘awareness change’,
which was based on a motor awareness questionnaire,
developed based on pre-existing, validated measures (e.g.,
Berti et al., 1996; Marcel et al., 2004), and administered
immediately before and after each Emotion condition. Previ-
ous studies have suggested that AHP patients may ‘learn’ the
‘correct’ responses to answers on awareness measures when
repeatedly administered (Marcel et al., 2004). To avoid such
repetition confounds, four equivalent versions of the ques-
tionnaire were developed. Each version comprised seven
items, covering four domains: (i) two general awareness
questions (e.g., “Do you have any weakness anywhere?”); (ii)
one question related to left unimanual ability, followed by a
‘confrontation’ and ‘check’ question (e.g., “Can you wave to
me with your left hand? Please do it for me now. Have you
done it?”); (iii) one question concerning bimanual action
ability, each followed by confrontation and check questions
(e.g., “Can you tie a knot? Please do it for me now. Have you
done it?”), and (iv) one bipedal awareness question (e.g., “Can
you climb a ladder?”). Each question was scored according to
themethod of Feinberg et al. (2000): 0¼ awareness; .5¼ partial
awareness; and 1.0 ¼ unawareness; therefore, higher scores
indicated greater unawareness (range ¼ 0e7). For each
Emotion condition (i.e., positive and negative feedback), we
subtracted the post-induction awareness score from the pre-
induction awareness score of each patient, to obtain a main
measure of awareness change.
Additionally, in order to evaluate the effects of emotional
feedback on patients' emotional state per se, patients were
asked to provide a subjective rating of their current emotional
state on a 6-point Likert-type scale (i.e., “Using this scale from
zero to five, zero being very unhappy and five being very
happy, how do you feel right now?”). The scale was read aloud
to patients and also presented visually as a vertical scale on an
A4 sheet of paper (0 at the bottom and 5 at the top), positioned
in the patient's right visual field in order to minimise possible
unilateral visual neglect effects. Patients were familiarised
with the rating scale before the experiment.
2.6. Procedures
The experiment was organised into two phases: [i] adminis-
tration of Hayling Test Part 1 (simple sentence completion)
with positive feedback, and [ii] administration of Hayling Test
Part 2 (inhibition of automatic response) with negative feed-
back. Thesewere conducted in a single session, separated by a
30-min interval, during which standard neuropsychological
tests (see above) were administered without feedback. Part 1of the Hayling Test requires the patient to complete a series of
sentences with the last word missing from it as fast as
possible (e.g., “The rich child attended a private…”, response:
school). The response and reaction time are recorded and the
total time score is converted into a scaled score. In part 2, the
patient is again asked to complete a series of sentences as
above, but their response is to be completely unconnected to
the sentence (e.g., “London is a very busy …”, possible
response: banana). The response and the reaction time are
recorded, and the total time and response errors are converted
into a scaled score.
Positive feedback was provided in a standardised manner,
using one of the following seven statements, in a pseudor-
andomised order: (i) “Well done”, (ii) “That is correct”, (iii)
“Your answer was very quick”, (iv) “Excellent work”, (v) “You
are doing so well on this task”, (vi) “Very impressive”, and (vii)
“Your performance has been excellent so far”. Positive feed-
back was matched to performance as much as possible, i.e.,
most answers were correct and given within one minute and
hence one of the above statements was provided. In the un-
likely event that an answer was wrong, statement (iii) was
provided; or, if an answer was very slow (more than one
minute), this statement was not used and one of the other
statements were provided. We wish to highlight that,
although this feedback was realistic in all cases, it was pre-
selected and false in the sense that it did not correspond to
the norms of the Hayling Test.
Similarly, negative feedback was provided using one of the
following seven standard statements: (i) “That is incorrect”, (ii)
“You are not doing very well on this task”, (iii) “Your perfor-
mance has been very poor so far”, (iv) “That is the wrong
answer”, (v) “You are doing poorly so far”, (vi) “Your answer
was too slow”, and (vi) “You are not performing very well”.
Feedback was consistent with patients' actual performance as
much as possible (in the same manner as above, but matched
to the poor performance of patients).
Measures of awareness were taken immediately before
(i.e., pre-induction awareness) and after (i.e., post-induction
awareness) the two parts of the task. The emotion rating
scale was completed after each post-induction awareness
questionnaire, in order not to influence the latter. During the
control experiment, the procedures were identical to the
above, except for reversing the order of phases one and two.
Patients were carefully and fully debriefed following
completion of the experiment; the purpose of the positive and
negative feedback were fully explained, and any questions
were addressed. It was stressed that the feedback provided did
not reflect of their actual performance on the Hayling Task, as
determined by the available, standardised norms, or by the
face value impressions the task itself might generate. Any
ongoingemotionaldistress (if experienced)was fullydiscussed
and reflected upon to ensure that the patients' emotional state
was stable. There were no particularly strong reactions during
the experiment, or following debriefing, and none of the pa-
tients reportedhaving guessed or suspected themanipulation.
2.7. Statistical analysis
All behavioural analyses were conducted in Stata 11
(StataCorp, 2011). Independent samples t-tests were used to
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logical tests. Items that were not normally distributed were
also analysed using the non-parametric equivalent (Man-
neWhitneyU test) to confirm our findings (see Supplementary
Materials).
2.7.1. Analysis of main experiment
The differential ‘awareness change’ scores (see Measures)
were used as the outcome measure in all analyses, which
were conducted using multiple linear regression. The aware-
ness change data were not normally distributed, hence we
applied bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions (bootstrapping
makes no assumption as to the distribution of the data; Guan,
2003); bootstrapped standard errors (SE) are therefore re-
ported. The same analysis was also run while co-varying for
overall negativemood (HADS depression scores, as thesewere
found to differ between the groups, see below). Preliminary
examination of the awareness change data identified one HP
control patient scoring more than two SD above the group
mean, and hence this patient was removed from subsequent
experimental analyses as an outlier.
2.7.2. Analysis of control variables
A multiple linear regression (as above) on emotion ratings
was used to investigate whether patients experienced a
change in their emotional state in the two feedback condi-
tions. The same analysis was also run while co-varying for
overall negative mood (HADS depression scores). Further-
more, to ensure there was no difference in the baseline
awareness scores preceding the positive and negative
feedback conditions (particularly given the fixed order of the
task), we conducted non-parametric tests comparing the
baseline awareness scores preceding the positive and the
negative feedback conditions in each group. In addition, we
also compared between groups the total scaled scores of the
Hayling Sentence Completion test, as well as the scaled
scores for Part 1 and 2, to ensure the actual performance of
both groups was consistent with the task's expected diffi-
culty levels, and that the provided feedback was realistic
and of similar relevance to both groups. Additionally,
modified t-tests (SINGLIMS_ES; Crawford, 2010; Crawford
et al., 2002, 1998) were used to determine whether the
awareness change scores of the two AHP patients in the
reverse-order experiment (see Section 2.4) differed signifi-
cantly from those of the HP group. Finally, in order to
investigate whether any changes in awareness resulting
from the experiment had a lasting effect, non-parametric
tests were used to compare Feinberg awareness scores ac-
quired on initial assessment (prior to the experimental
session) with those obtained 1e3 days after the experiment
was conducted.
2.8. Lesion analysis methods
Routinely acquired clinical CT (n¼ 10) andMRI (n¼ 5) data sets
were obtained within the first week of admission [admission
to neuroimaging interval: mean ¼ 4.26 days, SD ¼ 4.88 days].
The clinical data set of one HP control patient was unavailable
and the patient was therefore excluded from further imaging
analyses. Available structural data were converted intosoftware-readable formats for further processing. To facilitate
comparison between the clinical data and a standard space
template, we manually reoriented the native structural scan
of each patient to the origin of the template using SPM (Sta-
tistical Parametric Mapping, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/). Lesions were then reconstructed onto the MNI (Mon-
treal Neurological Institute) template provided within MRI-
cron (http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/)
whilst using all available clinical scans to guide the delinea-
tion. Lesions were mapped by two researchers, who were
blind to group classification and the behavioural scores of the
patients.
In a first step, lesion volume was obtained. Subsequently,
percentage lesion overlay maps for both groups, AHP and HP,
were computed in FSL (FMRIB Software Library, http://fsl.
fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/). In a second step, a lesion differ-
ence map between both groups was computed.
The classical voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping
(VLSM) approach (Bates et al., 2003; Rorden et al., 2007) as
implemented in the software package NPM (non-parametric
mapping; http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/npm/) (Karnath,
Berger, Ku¨ker, & Rorden, 2004; Rorden & Karnath, 2004) was
used to identify anatomical regions associated with: i) the
presence of anosognosia (Feinberg awareness scores, inverted
to adhere with the NPM prerequisite of the directionality of
the input data) and ii) the awareness change induced by the
experimental design (‘change in awareness' scores). Results
were calculated with the permutated non-parametric Brun-
nereMenzel test to correct for multiple comparison and small
sample size (Rorden et al., 2007; Volle et al., 2011). Results were
then projected onto a high-resolution template (Holmes et al.,
1998) in MNI standard space using MRIcron.3. Results
3.1. Demographic and neuropsychological results
Patients' demographic characteristics and their performance
on standardised neuropsychological tests are summarised in
Table 1. The groups did not differ significantly in terms of age,
education or symptom onset to assessment interval. As ex-
pected, there was a significant difference in awareness scores
between the AHP and HP groups on both the Berti et al. (1996)
interview [t(14) ¼ 5.60, p ¼ .00] and the Feinberg et al. (2000)
scale [t(14) ¼ 7.06, p ¼ .00]. The groups showed similar sen-
sory deficits, as well as similar impairments in general
cognitive functioning, abstract thinking, reasoning abilities
and neglect. Although both groups showed deficits in propri-
oception, the AHP group was significantly more impaired
[t(12) ¼ 2.33, p ¼ .04]. The AHP group showed significantly
lower scores for depression on the HADS when compared to
controls [t(14) ¼ 3.06, p ¼ .01]. This difference was taken into
account in subsequent analyses.
3.2. Main experimental results: awareness change
A linear regression analysis revealed a significant main ef-
fect for the factor Group (b ¼ 2.04, SE ¼ .45, p < .001, 95%
CI ¼ 1.16; 2.92), with the AHP group showing a greater
Table 1 e Groups' demographic characteristics and neuropsychological profile.
AHP(n ¼ 8) HP(n ¼ 8) t-Test
Mean SD Mean SD t df p
Age (years) 71.63 16.18 64.75 12.14 .96 14.00 .35
Education (years) 11.88 1.81 12.63 1.92 .68 14.00 .51
Days from onset 11.13 11.26 14.38 10.56 .60 14.00 .56
MRC Left upper limb .25 .46 .38 .52 .51 14.00 .62
MRC left lower limb .63 .92 1.00 1.07 .75 14.00 .46
Premorbid IQ-WTAR 41.50 7.79 33.00 7.62 1.41 10.00 .19
Berti awareness interview 1.63 .52 .25 .46 5.60 14.00 .00*
Feinberg awareness scale 6.31 2.17 .63 .69 7.06 14.00 .00*
Orientation 2.88 .35 3.00 .00 1.00 7.00 .35
Digit span forwards 5.63 1.19 6.13 .99 .91 14.00 .38
Digit span backwards 2.88 .83 3.38 1.30 .91 14.00 .38
MOCA memory 3.75 .89 4.17 .98 .83 12.00 .42
MMSE 22.20 6.02 25.00 2.16 .88 7.00 .41
Visual fields 4.29a 1.89 3.57a 1.99 .69 12.00 .50
Somatosensory (max 6) 3.38a 1.41 3.00a 1.60 .50 14.00 .63
Proprioception (max 9) 3.71 2.21 6.57 2.37 2.33 12.00 .04*
Comb/razor test left 4.75 4.13 5.25 2.60 .29 14.00 .78
Comb/razor test right 12.63 5.10 10.63 2.97 .96 14.00 .35
Comb/razor test ambiguous 5.88 1.96 4.13 2.42 1.59 14.00 .13
Bisiach one item test .75 .46 .38 .52 1.53 14.00 .15
Line crossing right 11.50 6.44 16.25 2.05 1.99 8.41 .08
Line crossing left 6.75a 8.14 10.00a 8.68 .77 14.00 .45
Star cancelation right (omissions) 13.75 6.11 11.00 6.19 .89 14.00 .39
Star cancelation left (omissions) 21.25a 10.43 18.88a 10.86 .45 14.00 .66
Copy .50a .76 1.00a 1.07 1.08 14.00 .30
Representational drawing .25 .46 .50 .53 1.00 14.00 .33
Line bisection right .43a .53 .38a .52 .20 13.00 .85
Line bisection centre .57a .53 .75a .46 .69 13.00 .50
Line bisection left .38a .52 .50a .53 .48 14.00 .64
Cognitive estimates 16.71a 4.86 15.50a 2.26 .56 11.00 .59
FAB total score 11.40a 2.70 13.50a 2.51 1.43 11.00 .18
HADS depression 2.88 2.70 8.00a 3.89 3.06 14.00 .01*
HADS anxiety 5.13 3.00 7.25 4.89 1.05 14.00 .31
Berti awareness interview¼ Berti et al. (1996); Feinberg Awareness scale¼ Feinberg et al. (2000); MRC¼Medical Research Council (Guarantors of
Brain, 1986); MOCA ¼ The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (Nasreddine et al., 2005); Comb/razor test ¼ tests of personal neglect (MacIntoch,
Brodie, & Beschin, 2000); Bisiach one item test ¼ test of personal neglect; Visual fields and somatosensory ¼ customary ‘confrontation’
technique ¼ Bisiach, Vallar, & Perani (1986); line crossing, star cancellation, copy & representational drawing ¼ conventional sub-tests of
Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, Cockborn & Halligan, 1987); FAB ¼ Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois et al., 2000); HADS ¼ Hospital
Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).
*Significant difference between groups, p < .05.
a Scores below tests' cut-off points, or more than 1 SD below average mean.
c o r t e x 6 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 2 7e1 4 0 133change in awareness (marginal mean ¼ .99) compared with
the HP group (marginal mean ¼ .02). Also, a significant
main effect of Emotion induction type (b ¼ 1.07, SE ¼ .46,
p ¼ .019, CI ¼ 1.96; .18) was observed, with awareness
change being significantly greater following the negative
(marginal mean ¼ 1.6) compared with the positive
emotional induction (marginal mean ¼ .57). The interac-
tion between Emotion induction type and Group was also
significant (b ¼ 2.05, SE ¼ .61, p ¼ .001, CI: 3.26; .84; see
Fig. 1), with the AHP group (marginal mean ¼ 2.55) showing
a greater change in awareness compared with the HP group
(marginal mean ¼ .75) following the negative emotional
induction only. Taking the HADS depression scores into
account in this analysis did not change the pattern of these
results.
A qualitative example of the change in motor awareness
observed as a result of the emotion induction is describedhere. During the pre-awareness assessment one patient
stated “No, I have noweakness anywhere, no”, claiming that “I
can move my arm, no problem” and was adamant that she
raised her left arm and clapped her hands. Following the
negative emotion induction, the same patient admitted that
her left arm “is not as strong as before the stroke”, saying “I
don't think I can move this arm now, it feels weak”. When
asked if she can tie a knot, she replied “I'm not so sure now”
and after attempting the action, she observed “no, I can't do
that.”
3.3. Emotional state induction
To investigate whether patients experienced a change in
their emotional state following the positive and negative in-
duction respectively, we examined the main effects of
Emotion (positive vs negative feedback) and Group (AHP
Fig. 1 eMarginal means and interquartile range (error bars)
of the change in awareness for the AHP (dark grey bars)
and HP (light grey bars) groups after the positive and
negative emotional induction: *p < .05. The Y-axis
indicates the change in awareness scores analysed by
calculating the difference in awareness scores between
each condition (post minus pre) for each group. Positive
scores indicate an increase in awareness (i.e., less
anosognosia) and negative scores indicate a decrease in
awareness (i.e., more anosognosia).
c o r t e x 6 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 2 7e1 4 0134vs HP) on emotion ratings. The regression analysis confirmed
a main effect of Emotion (b ¼ 1.83, SE ¼ .439, p < .001, CI: .97;
2.69) with patients giving significantly lower emotion ratings
(i.e., reporting feeling less happy) following the negative
emotional induction (marginal mean ¼ 2.17) compared with
the positive emotional induction (marginal mean ¼ 3.83). The
model also showed that the factor Group significantly pre-
dicted emotion ratings (b ¼ .99, SE ¼ .49, p ¼ .046, CI: .019;
1.97), with AHP patients showing more positive emotion
ratings (marginal mean ¼ 3.41) compared with right-
hemisphere controls (marginal means ¼ 2.59). However,
there was no significant interaction between the factors in-
duction type and group (b ¼ .33, SE ¼ .64, p ¼ .6, CI: 1.59;
.93; see Fig. 2).Fig. 2 eMarginal means and interquartile range (error bars)
of emotion ratings for AHP (Dark grey bars) and HP (light
grey bars) groups after positive and negative mood
induction: *p < .05. The Y-axis indicates the patient's
subjective mood ratings on a scale from zero to five
(0 ¼ very unhappy; 5 ¼ very happy).3.4. Baseline awareness scores
A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test revealed that there was no sig-
nificant difference between pre-awareness scores of the pos-
itive (median ¼ 2) and of the negative condition overall
(median¼ 3, Z¼.27, p¼ .82, r¼ .067). This applied also to the
AHP group (Z¼.9, p¼ .563, r¼ .23) and the HP group (Z ¼.7,
p ¼ .75, r ¼ .18), in respective, separate analyses.3.5. Performance on the Hayling Test
Analysis of the Hayling Sentence Completion Test using a
ManneWhitney U test showed no significant difference be-
tween total scaled scores of the AHP and HP groups (Z¼1.14,
p ¼ .28, r ¼ .29). According to the tests norms, overall scaled
scores indicated that the AHP group's performance was ‘low
average’ (median ¼ 4), while the HP group's performance was
‘moderate average’ (median ¼ 5). Similarly, there was no dif-
ference found in Hayling part 1 (Z ¼ .9, p ¼ .42, r ¼ .23), with
the scaled score for completion time being ‘low average’ for
the AHP group (median¼ 4) and ‘moderate average’ for the HP
group (median ¼ 5). This again applied to Hayling part 2, with
no difference found between groups in their total scaled score
for completion time (Z ¼ .4, p ¼ .8, r ¼ .1) and response errors
(Z ¼ 1.1, p ¼ .31, r ¼ .28), with the AHP group performing
‘average’ for time (median ¼ 6) and ‘abnormal’ for response
errors (median ¼ 1.5). Similarly, the HP group performed
‘average’ for time (median ¼ 6) and ‘abnormal’ for responses
errors (median ¼ 2) (see Supplementary Materials). Therefore,
the feedback given was realistic based on patients' actual
performance, with both groups performing better on part 1
than on part 2, and showing no differences between groups on
either part.3.6. Reverse order control condition
The two AHP patients who performed the experiment in the
reverse order showed the same pattern of results as found in
the main group analysis. After the negative emotion induc-
tion, both patients showed a greater improvement in aware-
ness (AHP09: mean ¼ 5, AHP10: mean ¼ 3.5) compared to the
control group (mean ¼ .5; SD ¼ .82; AHP09: t(7) ¼ 5.13, p ¼ .001,
r ¼ 5.49; AHP10: t(7) ¼ 3,42, p ¼ .007, r ¼ 3.66). There was no
difference between either AHP patient and the HP control
group in awareness change following positive emotion in-
duction (AHP09: t(7)¼ .45, p¼ .33, r¼ .48; and AHP10: t(7)¼ 1.7,
p ¼ .07, r ¼ 1.81).3.7. Specificity of effect control condition
The three patients with right-hemisphere damage who per-
formed this additional control experiment showed no change
in personal neglect assessments, and a minor change in vi-
suospatial neglect, with extrapersonal neglect becoming
slightly worse following negative versus positive induction in
two patients. Additionally, there was a non-mood specific
improvement in awareness of neglect in one patient. The re-
sults are summarised in 3 case reports below (see
Supplementary Materials Table S2 for a summary of results).
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no visuospatial neglect except on the ‘copy’ subtest, and mild
unawareness of drawing neglect. There was no change in vi-
suospatial and personal neglect, or awareness of drawing
neglect following the positive and negative emotion induction
condition. Patient HP10 presented with no AHP, mild personal
neglect, visuospatial neglect and unawareness of drawing
neglect. She showed no change in the line bisection subtest,
personal neglect scores, and general questions for awareness
of drawing neglect, but a small increase in visuospatial neglect
following the positive and negative emotion induction con-
ditions. There was also a small increase in awareness of
drawing neglect following the negative emotion induction, but
a much larger increase in awareness following positive in-
duction. Lastly, patient AHP11 presented with AHP, personal
neglect, visuospatial neglect and mild unawareness of draw-
ing neglect. There was no change in her personal neglect and
awareness of drawing neglect scores, and no change in her
performance on the line bisection subtest following the
negative and positive emotion inductions. There was a small
increase in visuospatial neglect (star cancellation subtest)
following the negative but not positive emotion induction.”3.8. Follow-up awareness testing
Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed that there was no signif-
icant difference in Feinberg awareness scores before and after
the experiment, in either the AHP (Z ¼ .45, p ¼ .66, r ¼ .12) or
HP group (Z ¼ 1.63, p ¼ .1, r ¼ .42), suggesting that theFig. 3 e Group-level lesion overlay maps for patients with anos
lesions in patients with anosognosia (AHP; n ¼ 8); B. Overlay of
comparing the two populations of patients (AHP present-AHP ab
for Z > 1.3).observed awareness changes were temporary and experi-
mental effects, rather than permanent, clinical changes.3.9. Lesion analysis
All lesions resulted from a first-ever unilateral stroke, mainly
within the right middle cerebral artery territory. Group-level
percentage lesion overlay for the AHP group (n ¼ 8) identified
the involvement of cortical and subcortical areas, comprising
the inferior and superior frontal gyri, the pericentral cortex,
the insula and insula ribbon, and the internal capsule (see
Fig. 3A). In comparison, the lesion overlap map for the HP
group (n ¼ 7) revealed a more focal lesion pattern involving
mainly subcortical regions (see Fig. 3B). Lesion volume
(defined by number of voxels) was not significantly different
between the AHP group (mean ¼ 37132.5, SD ¼ 43782.65) and
the HP group (mean ¼ 25997.14, SD ¼ 33536.03; t (15) ¼ .55,
p ¼ .594). The lesion subtraction map identified mainly the
anterior and posterior insular ribbon, the posterior basal
ganglia, and dorsal pericentral areas to differ between the
groups (see Fig. 3C).
VLSM analysis using the continuous Feinberg awareness
scores, revealed that voxels within the posterior insula, the
supramarginal, the angular and superior temporal gyrus (SMG,
AG and STG), internal capsule, pericentral gyri, and the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG)were significantly associatedwithdifferences
in awareness (p < .05) (see Fig. 4A). Similar results were found
when co-varying lesion size. Additionally, VLSM analysis,
looking at the experimental change in awareness scores (i.e.,ognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) and controls. A. Overlay of
patients without anosognosia (n ¼ 7). C. Statistical analysis
sent; results are corrected for multiple comparisons, p < .05
Fig. 4 e Voxel-based (topological) lesion-deficit analysis. A. Damaged MNI voxels predicting the severity of unawareness of
symptom deficits when co-varying for lesion size (Feinberg scale, inverted, continuous measure; p < .05 for Z > 1.6449). B.
Damaged MNI voxels predicting the change in awareness (differential scores, pre and post mood induction) when co-
varying for lesion size (continuous measure; p < .05 for Z > 1.6449). PrC ¼ precentral, PoC ¼ postcentral,
SMG ¼ supramarginal, STG þ superior temporal gyrus, IFG ¼ inferior frontal gyrus, IC ¼ internal capsule, MFG, middle
frontal gyrus.
c o r t e x 6 1 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 2 7e1 4 0136differential scores followingnegativeemotional inductiononly),
without and with co-variation of lesion size, identified signifi-
cant voxels (p < .05) within the anterior arm of the internal
capsule, the anterior insula, the anterior lateral putamenwith a
lateral extension into the external capsule and an additional
region in the dorsal anterior periventricularwhitematter (likely
to contain limbic white matter connections) (see Fig. 4B).4. Discussion
In the present study, we experimentally induced positive and
negative emotions in patients with AHP and HP controls, and
measured the resulting changes in motor awareness. We also
investigated the brain lesions associated with the clinical
diagnosis of AHP, as well as with performance on our exper-
imental task. The main behavioural finding was that patients
with AHP showed a significant improvement in motor
awareness following a negative, but not a positive, emotion
induction. The main finding of the analysis combining
experimental and lesion datawas that lesions to the putamen,
the anterior insula, the capsules and the anterior periven-
tricular white matter were associated with less awareness
improvement on our experimental task. These findings are
discussed in turn below.
To our knowledge, this is the first experimental demon-
stration of the role of emotion in AHP. Our results show thatnegative, self-referential emotion induced by social feedback
can lead to temporary improvements in motor awareness, in
patients who otherwise show stable AHP. These results are
consistent with previous clinical observations of transitory
awareness improvements and ‘catastrophic reactions’
following discussions of negative themes such as loss, sepa-
ration or mortality (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). They are
also consistent with experimental manipulations of
perspective-taking, in which taking a third person perspective
of one's disability can lead to awareness improvements and
increase of depressive emotions (Fotopoulou et al., 2009;
Marcel et al., 2004). We believe these results cannot be
accounted for by either the psychodynamic or ‘valence’ hy-
pothesis (see Introduction), and instead are best explained by
theories that assume ‘top-down’, emotional abnormalities
(Fotopoulou et al., 2010, 2014; Vuillemier, 2004; Turnbull et al.,
2005). Moreover, although we tested changes to neglect and
unawareness for neglect following emotion induction in only
a small subset of patients, it appears that the effects of
negative emotion on awareness are specific to motor aware-
ness and do not extend to neglect or its unawareness. We
discuss these findings and their potential interpretations in
turn below.
While our results could be interpreted as psychodynamic
‘lifting’ of denial and repression, the psychodynamic hy-
pothesis could just as easily predict the opposite result,
namely a defensive, decrease of awareness due to the
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Thus, the predictions of this theory in relation to our results
are not clear. Similarly, although patients with AHP showed
significantly less depressive feelings and symptoms than
controls on a self-report measure (see also Fotopoulou et al.,
2010), our experimental results could not be accounted for
by the ‘valence’ hypothesis. This is because patients with
AHP showed greater awareness changes following
the negative emotion induction, suggesting that they were
able to process such emotions at some level. Indeed, both
groups reported feeling more negative emotions following
negative versus positive feedback in a ‘manipulation check’
measure. Interestingly, during the experiment, patients
with AHP reported feeling overall more positive emotion
than control patients, but this effect was unrelated to the
valence of the feedback provided. This may relate to the
aforementioned, more general tendency of patients with
AHP to report (rather than experience) less negative emo-
tions (see also Turnbull et al., 2005). Thus, as our patients
were able to experience increased negative emotions
following the negative emotion induction and increased
positive emotions following the positive emotion induction,
our results suggest that their emotional difficulties do not
consist of a primary deficit in emotional processing (as the
valence hypothesis suggests). Instead, as their emotional
difficulties seem to relate more specifically to their motor
awareness (see also above), they may be suffering
from a more specific, higher-order impairment in
consciously, self-attributing negative emotions, i.e., attrib-
uting negative emotions to at least some of their higher-
order self-representations (see also Fotopoulou, 2010;
Turnbull et al., 2005).
This interpretation is also supported by the findings of
our lesion mapping analysis. Specifically, the presence
(lesion overlay results) and severity (Feinberg VLSM results)
of anosognosia were associated with lesions to a range of
cortical and subcortical areas previously associated with
AHP (Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Karnath et al.,
2005; Moro et al., 2011; Vocat et al., 2010). However, worse
performance on the critical condition of our experimental
task (i.e., less awareness change following negative feed-
back) was associated with lesions to the putamen, the
anterior insula, the capsules and the anterior periventricular
white matter.
The insula, and particularly its anterior sectors, is
increasingly identified as the neural substrate for the
conscious representational of internal bodily signals (inter-
oception; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, €Ohman, & Dolan, 2004;
Craig, 2009), as well as for the processing of salience (Seeley
et al., 2007). Thus, in patients with AHP, damage to the
right insula and related white matter connections may be
linked with impoverished interoceptive signals about the
left-side of the body (see also Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Karnath
et al. 2005). We speculate that this deficit may affect how
patients process the salience and emotional significance of
signals arising in this body side, thus explaining how they
can remain in denial of their paralysis and/or apathetic to-
wards the normally alarming sight of a paralysed left arm
(Romano, Gandola, Bottini, & Maravita, 2014). Similarly, the
functional role of the basal ganglia and particularly thestriatum has been associated with prediction error-driven
learning (O'Doherty et al., 2003), as well as the aberrant
salience theories of psychosis (Gray et al., 1991; Kapur, 2003).
In AHP such deficits can be linked with both specific in-
stances of aberrant motor monitoring in functionally speci-
alised systems (Berti et al., 2005), or more generally in global
error monitoring, salience processing and belief updating
(Davies, Davies, & Coltheart, 2005; Venneri & Shanks, 2004;
Vocat et al., 2013). For example, according to a probabilistic,
predictive coding theory of AHP (Fotopoulou, 2012; 2014),
such lesions could be understood to disrupt neuro-
modulatory circuits in AHP, leading for example to
dopamine-depletion and a difficulty in optimising the preci-
sion (uncertainty) of prediction errors (Friston et al., 2012),
affecting their salience and, ultimately, the learning of new
information. Thus, even when signals about the current state
of the body may be available, they may be ‘imprecise’, and
thus unable to update prior beliefs about the self. This ulti-
mately leads to aberrant inferences about one's current
abilities and abnormal adherence to past beliefs about the
body.
We can thus speculate that in AHP patients who fail to
update their emotions and beliefs about their current state
of the body (i.e., their left-sided paralysis), the provision of
negative feedback by social means can generate negative
emotions about the self and new learning on the basis of
other intact areas. Future studies will be needed to verify
this prediction, perhaps using functional neuroimaging to
detect residual emotional processing in AHP patients. In
addition, given the potential specificity of our effects (con-
cerning motor but not spatial awareness), future studies
should explore the psychological and neural relation be-
tween emotional processing and the motor system. Indeed,
a growing literature is suggesting a tight interrelation be-
tween emotion and motor representations (see Pereira et al.,
2010; Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014. Consistent with the current
findings, previous studies have shown that while negative
emotional processing competes for attentional resources
with visual tasks to the detriment of performance on the
latter (Erthal et al., 2005; Hartikainen, Ogawa,& Knight, 2000;
Tipples & Sharma, 2000), they may enhance processing in
motor-related brain areas. Indeed, several studies of non-
human primates have found the involvement of motor-
related cortical areas during threatening contexts (e.g.,
Graziano & Cooke, 2006), while emotional threat has been
found to be associated with increased motor cortex excit-
ability in humans (Baumgartner, Willi, & J€ancke, 2007;
Hajcak et al., 2007; Oliveri et al., 2003). Induction of fear
has been found to modulate activity in primary motor cortex
and putamen (Butler et al., 2007; Phelps et al., 2001). These
findings have been interpreted in contemporary theories of
emotion as consistent with the idea that aversive contexts
engage motor circuits in order to prepare participants for
action that may protect the organism from threat (Azevedo
et al., 2005; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001;
Hajcak et al., 2007). The current results may indeed relate to
such an enhancement of activity in residual motor-related
areas and future, electromyography or neuroimaging
studies can specifically test such speculations and
predictions.
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Our small sample size and the inherent limitations of the
voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping approach (Geva, 2012;
Rorden, 2007; Volle et al., 2011), only allow for preliminary
evidence of the possible neural correlates observed. Never-
theless, our VLSM approach, compared to other lesion anal-
ysismethods, does offer several advantages, including the use
of continuous scores of behavioural performance instead of
the classification of patients into categorical groups. An
additional limitation concerns the fact that we did not include
a ‘neutral emotion’ or ‘no feedback’ control condition in our
experiment, which we could compare with both negative and
positive emotion conditions. In addition, we could not control
for floor effects in the control group given the unique nature of
anosognosia. Nevertheless, although there was a smaller
margin for change in awareness scores for the control group,
there was still a small change evident in the same direction as
the AHP group. Furthermore, this control group allowed us to
control for other more basic confounding effects such as age,
test adherence, cognitive functioning, practice, repetition,
comprehension and fatigue effects.
Importantly, the observed changes were temporary and
generated under specific experimental conditions, and thus
the results of our experiment are not directly relevant to
clinical studies. However, our findings do have indirect im-
plications for clinical work; they reinforce the previously
demonstrated link between awareness improvement and
depressive feelings, as well as more generally emphasise the
role of emotion in the syndrome, despite some patients'
apparent lack of emotional reactivity.
4.2. Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to conduct a sys-
tematic, experimental investigation of the relation between
emotion and motor awareness in right-hemisphere stroke
patients with AHP. We have shown that motor awareness is
sensitive to the induction of negative emotions in a social
context, and this effect seems to relate to insular and striatal
areas, and related white matter connections. We argued that
neither pure psychodynamic, nor neurocognitive theories are
sufficient to explain these results. Instead, we speculatively
suggest that lesions to such regions may impair interceptive
signals and neuromodulatory pathways associated with
motivation. Ultimately, such deficits result in an inability to
update prior beliefs about the self and affectively personalise
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